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The Impact of Governance on the Outcomes of Contracting Out 
Jacob Torfing, Eva Sørensen and Lena Brogaard 
1. Introduction 
The practice of contracting out public services to private actors is as old as the public sector itself, 
and is found in areas as diverse as military defense, digital solutions, public utilities, and specialized 
social services (Kelman, 2002). More recently, however, a mixture of tighter fiscal constraints, anti-
government ideologies, political pressures from external actors, and administrative reforms inspired 
by the New Public Management approach has significantly expanded governments’ reliance on 
private markets to deliver tax-funded services (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2007; Bel and 
Fageda, 2007). Even though systematic reviews show a relative decline over time in the economic 
gains from allowing private for-profit actors to produce and deliver public services (Petersen, 
Hjelmar and Vrangbæk, 2015), contracting out will continue to be a major task for governments in 
the foreseeable future. Local governments all over the world are caught in the crossfire between 
citizens’ growing expectations and scarce public resources. They are constantly looking for ways to 
improve service quality while cutting costs, and contracting out is frequently used as a tool to 
achieve those aims.  
Public services are contracted out to a range of private for-profit actors, private non-profit actors, 
intergovernmental collaborations and public-private corporations (Warner and Hefetz, 2002; Bel 
and Fageda, 2008, 2010). However, the early enthusiasm for outsourcing public services has 
dwindled due to the frequent absence of the right conditions for successful outsourcing, and the 
discovery of a series of unintended consequences of service contracting  (Boardman and Hewitt, 
2004; Davies, 2008). As a result, public managers today seek to navigate in imperfect conditions 
and to balance competing goals and concerns in a politically charged environment (Hefetz and 
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Warner, 2011). Hence, the study of contracting out is both growing as an empirical field, and 
becoming increasingly focused on analyzing the complex conditions for more or less successful 
outcomes (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). 
In response to the growth, complexity and mixed results of contracting out, Kettl (2002) called for 
the development of a more comprehensive strategic-analytical framework for practicing and 
studying its management. While some scholars have heeded that call, the bulk of research on 
contracting out continues the line of research originally defined by transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1981, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Lane, 2000). The transaction cost 
perspective focuses on the reasons and conditions for contracting out public services, as well as on 
the actual gains in terms of higher economic efficiency. This explanation has steered the theoretical 
focus of researchers towards the need to coordinate the exchange between public and private actors, 
motivate both parties to observe contractual obligations, and minimize the transaction costs of 
contracting (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Few studies, however, have focused on the important 
question of how public authorities govern, organize and manage service contracting in practice 
(Brown and Potoski, 2003b; Romzek and Johnston, 2002). Fewer still have explored whether and 
how local governing practices contribute to improving the outcomes of contracting out in terms of 
service quality and economic efficiency (Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011; Girth et al., 2012, 
Fernandez, 2007).  
Nonetheless, government officials increasingly find themselves governing the contracting out of 
public services rather than producing and delivering them (Romzek and Johnston, 2005). Therefore, 
we need to know what works in terms of public actors’ efforts to secure the desired outcomes of 
contracting out. This article aims to deepen our understanding of the impact that local governing 
practices have on the outcomes of contracting out, based on a systematic review of 21 international 
studies from 2000-2018. Specifically, the article sets out to answer the following research question: 
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How do local governing practices influence the outcomes of contracting out? Based on the literature 
review, the article combines existing empirical and theoretical knowledge on the governance of 
contracting out in order to develop a theoretical framework. The purpose of the framework is to 
clarify the causal link between governance and the outcomes of contracting out, facilitate the 
development of testable hypotheses for empirical studies, and provide a guide that practitioners can 
use to improve contract performance.  
The article proceeds in the following way. The next section presents the methodology used to 
conduct the systematic literature review. We then develop a theoretical framework based on the 
results from the literature review, deducing eight impact factors that mediate the influence of 
governance, organization and management on the outcomes of contracting out. Finally, we discuss 
the use and relevance of the theoretical framework for developing testable hypotheses, before 
summarizing the argument and avenues for further research. 
2. Methodology: Systematic literature review 
In order to shed more light on the impact of governing practices on the outcomes of contracting out, 
we conducted a systematic review of the research literature from 2000-2018 that focuses on the 
impact of local governance on the outcomes of contracting out.  
2.1 Search for studies 
The search was conducted in three steps. First, we searched for relevant studies in a database 
consisting of 6,177 international studies on contracting out published between 2000 and 2014. This 
database was compiled by a previous research project in which a systematic search was conducted 
in 13 databases (see Petersen, Hjelmar, Vrangbæk and la Cour, 2011; Petersen, Hjelmar and 
Vrangbæk, 2018).1 The search comprised studies in English and Scandinavian languages that 
focused on contracting out, public procurement, outsourcing, marketization and service contracting 
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in advanced industrialized countries including Europe, North America, the Antipodes, Japan and 
South Korea. The choice of countries represents a wider geographical scope than previous literature 
reviews on the outcomes of contracting out, and allows us to examine the governance of contracting 
out in countries with different institutional and regulatory contexts, albeit within comparable 
economic situations (Petersen, Hjelmar and Vrangbæk, 2018). We do not include privatization, as in 
the sale of public assets, or public-private partnerships in our definition of contracting out (Hodge 
2000). We only consider those cases where the production of public services has been temporarily 
transferred to a private business based on competitive tendering, and is paid for by public 
authorities (Petersen et al. 2018). This database of 6,177 studies represents the population of 
relevant studies on contracting out for the purpose of our study. However, we supplemented the 
database with an updated search from 2015 to 2018, as described in step three.  
Second, in order to narrow the search in the existing database of studies on contracting out to align 
it with our research question, we defined further search terms pertaining to our focus on local 
governing practices. Local governing practices structure and condition attempts by public officials 
to use contracting out to produce better services at lower costs (for notable exceptions see Brown, 
Potoski and Slyke, 2006; Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2007; Lindholst, 2009; Nuppenau, 
2008; Lindholst og Bogetoft, 2011). In accordance with the new institutionalism (Peters, 2011), we 
assume that public actors aiming to improve the outcomes of contracting out operate in an 
institutional context of relatively stable forms of governance, organization and management that 
together constitute local governing practices. Governance is here defined as the rule-bound 
procedures that channel and regulate social interaction. Organization is defined as the rules, norms 
and routines that authorize action, empower actors, and shape their cultural orientation. 
Management is defined as the attempt to influence the perception and actions of social actors in 
order to generate particular outcomes. Together, these three interrelated types of institutional 
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governing practices shape public actors’ calculations about the consequences of different actions, as 
well as their perception of which actions are appropriate in different situations (March and Olsen, 
1995).  
Based on this understanding of governing practices, we searched the titles, abstracts and keywords 
of the 6,177 studies using the following search terms: governance, management, leadership, 
organization, steering, coordination, and transaction costs. We did not include the term ‘outcome’ 
or any specific definitions of outcomes of contracting out such as economic efficiency or cost 
reduction, as this would have narrowed down the search too much. Instead, we used this as a 
criterion for the inclusion of studies, which we present in the next section.2 The search resulted in 
140 studies that appeared to focus on the public governance of contracting out.  
Finally, we supplemented the search in the database of studies from 2000 to 2014 with a new search 
in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) from 2015 to 2018, in order to identify more recent 
studies that were not included in the database by Petersen et al. (2011; 2018). We searched for 
journal articles in English and employed the same geographical criteria. Moreover, we applied the 
same key words for contracting out and governance that we used in the first literature review from 
2000 to 2014 (see above).3 The only exception was the term ‘transaction cost’, which we did not 
apply in the second search, recognizing that it was less relevant for our definition of governance. 
We did not use the full range of databases applied in the first search on contracting out, as we 
considered that the governance of contracting out is mainly a concern for those academic 
disciplines (especially public management and administration) represented by journals covered by 
the SSCI. With regard to language, we furthermore found that including Scandinavian languages 
might create a bias in the search for literature. Hence, in the second round, we limited the search to 
studies in English. This yielded 1.100 results, of which 26 appeared to be relevant, leading to a total 
of 166 studies. 
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2.2 Criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of studies  
We read the abstracts for all 166 studies and evaluated the eligibility of each study for inclusion in 
the systematic review, based on the criteria listed below. If the relevance of the study was not clear 
from the abstracts, then we read the article in full. Criteria pertaining to language, 
region/geography, type of publication and time delimitation are defined in the review by Petersen et 
al. (2018) that formed the basis for our search. As the last systematic review of the effects of 
contracting out was published at the turn of the millennium (Hodge, 2000), we only searched for 
studies published since 2000, and which corresponded to the criteria used by Petersen et al. (2018). 
Below, we clarify the two additional criteria of specific relevance to our focus that we applied in 
evaluating the search results.  
1) Topic: we only included studies that related local governance to the outcomes of contracting 
out public services. Different types of outcomes are relevant in a discussion of contracting 
out (Lindholst et al., 2018). We acknowledge the diversity in outcomes, but the focus of this 
study is the crucial and recurring question of whether or not contracting out provides 
services at lower costs without eroding service quality. We only included studies that dealt 
with outcomes pertaining to cost and service quality, and we excluded studies that solely 
focused on other types of outcomes, e.g. innovation. We included studies that examined 
governing practices as defined earlier in this article. 
2) Research design and methods: both empirical and theoretical studies were included as they 
provide insights into the mechanisms linking governance, contracting out and outcomes. All 
types of empirical design and methods were included, as long as the authors applied them in 
a valid and transparent way and moved beyond a purely descriptive purpose. 
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In total, 145 out of the 166 articles failed to meet our criteria, bringing the sample of relevant 
studies for the systematic review down to 21. The 145 studies were excluded due to one or more of 
three reasons. 1) They were not concerned with public governance, organization and management 
in relation to contracting out public services 2) They were not deemed eligible either because they 
were descriptive case studies, reviews, focused on the impact of contracting out on public 
governance (reverse causality), or aimed to discover the determinants for contracting out, including 
the decision to make or buy 3) They used valid and transparent methods and empirical data to 
document new findings and trends in the public governing of contracting out, but without relating 
these to the outcomes of contracting out in terms of economic efficiency and service quality.  
2.3 Descriptive overview of the included studies 
Among the 21 studies included in the review, four are theoretical and aim to conceptualize the link 
between contracting out and outcomes, and we draw on these in the next section where we develop 
our own framework for studying the impact of governance on the outcomes of contracting out. The 
17 empirical studies explore or test the impact of public governance, organization and/or 
management on enhancing quality and lowering the costs by contracting out.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the 21 studies. The table shows that the majority of the empirical 
studies are set in the U.S., while the rest are distributed across European countries, with only a few 
studies in Australia and Canada. The most common research designs are longitudinal and cross-
sectional (case studies and surveys), displaying a mix of quantitative and qualitative data and 
methods. Finally, the studies analyze the local governance of the contracting out of many different 
types of products or services of either a technical or human nature, such as refuse services or elder 
care. Several American studies furthermore analyze multiple types of services based on the same 
source of data.  
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Table 1. Overview of studies included in the review 
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2.4 Data analysis 
Due to the limited number of studies and the variety in research designs and data, we analyzed the 
included studies using a qualitative thematic approach rather than, e.g. quantitative meta-analysis 
(Booth, Sutton and Papaioannou, 2016). We carefully read each article and assessed which key 
factors the authors find crucial in explaining the relationship between governance and the outcomes 
of contracting out (see supplementary material) and how these were found to influence the 
outcomes. In this process, we found several recurring factors across countries and types of services 
that are central to understanding the impact of local governance on the outcomes of contracting out 
in different contexts. We return to these impact factors when we develop the theoretical framework. 
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3. Development of a theoretical framework: The impact of governance on the outcomes of 
contracting out 
In the introduction, we touched upon the need to develop a theoretical framework due to some of 
the shortcomings of especially transaction cost theory in fully explaining the influence of 
governance on the outcomes of contracting out. Our systematic review identified four studies that 
address some of these shortcomings by striving to develop a broader framework for studying how 
governing practices may affect the likelihood that contracting out will lead to better and cheaper 
services.  
Brown, Potoski and Slyke (2006) emphasize the role of public managers in managing competitive 
tendering and handling the implicit goal conflicts, but they also insist that public managers operate 
within a broader political and institutional context. Lindholst (2009), as well as Lindholst and 
Bogetoft (2011), agree that institutional theory provides an important supplement to transaction cost 
theory and helps us to broaden the analytical perspective from the coordination, motivation and 
minimization of transaction costs to include competences and resources, communication and 
collaboration, and intrinsic forms of motivation. Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lamplight (2007) come 
closest to developing a comprehensive framework that can guide systematic studies of the impact of 
public governance on the outcomes of outsourcing.  
Overall, these four studies provide important theoretical insights. However, they do not fully 
explain the causal links in terms of how, when and why different local governance practices 
influence the outcomes of contracting out, and some of them define the dependent variable in much 
broader terms than we do. In this section, we present the results of our systematic review by 
developing a theoretical framework. The framework combines insights from the four theoretical 
studies with findings from the past two decades of empirical research represented by the 17 
empirical studies to conceptualize and operationalize these causal links. Specifically, we deduce 
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eight impact factors expected to mediate the influence of governance on the outcomes of 
contracting out. 
3.1 The overall layout of the theoretical framework 
Figure 1 illustrates the overall theoretical framework. The basic assumption informing Figure 1 is 
that, depending on the  structural context, local governing practices will play a decisive role in 
shaping the various impact factors that provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
contracting out to lead to better and cheaper services. Hence, governance, organization and 
management are the levers that institutionally situated public actors can use to enhance the 
likelihood that contracting out will improve public services while lowering costs. Learning-based 
feedback from reflections on actual performance may help to improve institutional governing 
practices. Hence, we acknowledge that there is a feedback loop between independent, mediating 
and dependent variables. This suggests a bi-directional causality, as public agencies may adopt new 
or changed governing practices based on experiences with, and feedback from, mediating and 
dependent variables.  
Let us take a closer look at these intervening and independent variables in order to better understand 
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3.2 Outcomes of contracting out 
The dependent variable is ‘value for money through contracting out’. In less ideologically charged 
words, the dependent variable aims to capture whether contracting out leads to lower service costs 
without eroding quality, preferably with an increase in quality alongside reduced costs (Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1993). Supporters of New Public Management believe that both cost efficiency and 
service quality can be measured, but in practice this is often difficult (Hood and Dixon, 2015; 
Lindholst et al., 2015, Lindholst et al., 2018). Moreover, whether contracting out improves value for 
money is contested, as empirical studies point in different directions and many of them suffer from 
a series of methodological problems (see Boyne, 1998). The overall verdict is that there is a net gain 
if certain conditions are fulfilled (Savas, 1987; Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Hodge, 2000; but see 
Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). Still, a systematic review of international studies on the economic 
gains resulting from contracting out public services to for-profit contractors shows that the average 
efficiency gains have declined progressively (Petersen, Hjelmar and Vrangbæk, 2015). In addition, 
there is evidence of systematic trade-offs between economic efficiency and quality (Lowery, 1998; 
Sclar, 2000) as well as between economic efficiency and other relevant public goals such as equity, 
accountability and responsiveness (Brown, Potoski and Slyke, 2006). The purpose of this study, 
however, is not to assess whether or to what degree contracting out results in more value for money, 
but to identify and theorize how local governing practices can increase the likelihood of better 
outcomes. 
3.3 Impact factors 
We define the intermediate or intervening variable in terms of a series of ‘impact factors’. These are 
eight critical factors that improve the likelihood that the local governing of contracting out will 
create greater value for money. Building on Lindholst and Bogetoft (2011) and the bulk of the 
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reviewed studies, the list of impact factors is expanded beyond the traditional focus on competition, 
coordination, extrinsic motivation and contract monitoring. We will now explain the eight impact 
factors, their causal mechanisms and what we view as their associated dilemmas.  
First, the reviewed studies show that local governance serves the important role of managing and 
responding to markets to increase competition. It is a well-known assumption that competition 
among potential contractors can drive prices down and service quality up and thus generate value 
for money. Our review shows that when competition is low in terms of the number of bidders, 
public managers make use of such procedures as ‘unbundling’ services, attracting private for-profit 
and non-profit bidders, making public agencies compete with private bidders, retaining a portion of 
the contracted service in-house (concurrent sourcing), and using intergovernmental contracting as 
an alternative to competitive contracting (Girth et al., 2012; Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Ohemeng 
and Grant, 2014).  A comparative case study of bus tendering shows that there are more bidders, 
more contract renewals and fewer collusive behaviors in London, where the transport network is 
unbundled so that contractors can bid for one or several bus routes, than in France, where entire 
transport networks are contracted out (Amaral, Saussier and Yvrande-Billon, 2009). Consequently, 
the price for contracted bus services is falling in London but rising in France. However, while more 
competition helps to discipline private contractors, there can sometimes be too much competition. A 
high number of bidders is costly both for the public purchaser and the private providers, potentially 
off-setting the benefits of increased competition (Constantino et al., 2012; Fernandez, 2009). In 
these situations, a pre-qualification system is justified to limits the number of bidders by defining a 
threshold in terms of required experience, competences and capacity. In a study of local U.S. 
governments, Fernandez (2007) find that the most successful cases of contractual relationships are 
characterized by a smaller number of bidders compared to the average case. An example from Italy 
likewise shows that reducing the number of actual bidders to an ‘optimal number’ reduces 
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transaction costs both for the public purchaser and the private providers (Constantino et al., 2012). 
Hence, the dilemma is to establish an appropriate level of competition in a given market, keeping in 
mind that increasing market competition can reduce the size of the contractors’ market share and 
thus their ability to benefit from scale economies.  
Secondly, when public authorities contract out services to private providers, the actual outcome 
depends on coordination and collaboration between public managers and private actors (Mattisson 
and Thomasson, 2007; Desrieux, Chong and Saussier, 2013; Peat and Costly, 2001; Lenferink, 
Tillema and Arts, 2013). Specifically, outcomes depend on the ability to align goals, ensure 
compatibility between different organizational systems, create synergies, avoid gaps and overlaps in 
the provision of services, and solve emerging problems. The reviewed studies show that 
‘competitive dialogue’ and ‘pre-qualification’ represent some of the procedures and regulations that 
public managers use to coordinate and collaborate with private actors to enhance outcomes (Brown 
and Potoski, 2004; Costantino et al., 2012; Lenferink, Tillema and Arts, 2013; Ohemeng and Grant, 
2014; Hefetz and Warner, 2011). ‘Competitive dialogue’ may be used in relation to complex 
services where it is difficult to specify the technical, legal and financial makeup in advance 
(Lenferink, Tillema and Arts, 2013). Competitive dialogue allows public purchasers to organize and 
engage in a pre-bid public-private dialogue about the public’s needs and requests and the solutions 
proposed by potential private bidders. As an example, a study of four Dutch infrastructure projects 
applying the competitive dialogue tool found that it facilitated information exchange, clarified and 
modified public expectations, and stimulated interest in competitive bidding. However, the dilemma 
is that coordination and collaboration are costly and time consuming, especially when information 
asymmetry is high and there are diverging goals and interests (Brown and Potoski, 2004; Oh and 
Park, 2017; Ke, Ling and Zou, 2015). Consequently, public authorities should enhance coordination 
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and collaboration, while seeking to avoid a situation where rising transaction costs undermine the 
potential gains of contracting out (Brown, Potoski and Slyke, 2006; Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011). 
The third impact factor is support from politicians, employees and end users. In some places, 
contracting out is politically controversial because of the inherent risks of lower supply security, 
opportunistic behavior such as parking and creaming, high transaction costs from monitoring, and 
lack of responsiveness and accountability (Amirkhanyan and, Kim and Lambright, 2007). Several 
studies document that support from politicians, public employees and end users is, therefore, 
important in preventing opposition that will undermine the potential benefits of contracting out 
(Romzek and Johnston, 2005; Ohemeng and Grant, 2014; Hefetz and Warner, 2011; Fernandez, 
2009). However, attempts to secure support through information, consultation and open debate may 
result either in increased support or stronger resistance. Hence, the dilemma is whether decisions to 
contract out public services should be subject to public debate that tends to politicize the issue, but 
may help to create support through negotiation; or to rely instead on administrative routines that 
will tend to de-politicize such decisions, but fail to generate widespread support (Brown, Potoski 
and Slyke, 2006). 
The fourth impact factor is the flexible adjustment of requests for proposals, contracts and 
procedures. Our own general observation across the reviewed studies is that requests for proposals, 
service contracts and the procedures for monitoring and sanctioning performance are often rigid, 
inadequate and difficult to specify. Hence, there is much to gain from flexible adjustments in 
response to changing conditions, possibilities and demands, as higher levels of contract 
performance can be achieved based on flexible and cooperative methods (Fernandez, 2007). 
Flexible adjustment requires an open and constructive dialogue that may be stymied by public 
displays of authority and internal competition among contractors. Flexibility thereby influences, and 
is influenced by, other impact factors, depending to some extent on more coordination and trust, but 
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less monitoring and control. However, the rule of thumb is that the higher the degree of flexibility, 
the greater the benefits of contracting out. However, the dilemma is that enhanced flexibility will 
tend to make it more difficult to monitor performance. It is always tricky to measure a moving 
target. 
The fifth impact factor is trust relations and mutual learning, which relates to the second impact 
factor of coordination and collaboration. Trust lowers transaction costs because it becomes easier to 
coordinate actions, and the costs of monitoring performance are reduced (Brown, Potoski and 
Slyke, 2006). Since contracts are always incomplete, purchasers and providers have to deal with 
non-contractible issues and outcomes through informal interaction and collaboration. A high level 
of trust and trust-based learning facilitates the coordination required to deal with non-contractible 
issues, thereby improving efficiency (Fernandez, 2009). Trust also facilitates mutual learning that, 
in turn, leads to continuous improvement or innovative step change, both in the way that 
coordination is provided (Mattison and Thomasson, 2007; Desrieux, Chong and Saussier, 2013). 
For instance, Desrieux, Chong and Saussier (2013) show that the bundling of public services 
provided by the same private provider lowers the total price of the services without hampering 
quality based on contract information from 5,000 local governments in France. Empirical tests show 
that this result can neither be explained by economies of scale nor by endogeneity. Rather, public 
purchasers seem to develop a closer interaction with those private providers that are responsible for 
delivering a bundle of services; the collaborative interaction helps to detect and solve emerging 
problems and challenges at an early stage. However, empirical studies of contracting strategies in 
Australia (Ke, Ling, and Zou 2015) and the U.S. (Oh and Park 2017) find that the use of relational 
contracting, i.e., emphasis on trust and shared understanding over time, can incur higher costs. Trust 
is conditioned by close personal interaction and the development of common values that tend to 
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reduce competition and increase transaction costs (Brown, Potoski and Slyke, 2006; Oh and Park, 
2017). So here we have another dilemma. 
The sixth impact factor is the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of contractors. Whether or not value 
for money is generated by outsourcing depends on the motivation of private contractors to deliver 
the desired outcomes (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2007: Koning and Heinrich, 2013). There 
is growing appreciation of the need to supplement the extrinsic ‘sticks and carrots’ motivation of 
private providers through performance-based contracts with intrinsic motivation and a public 
service commitment that is integrated into their professional training and sustained by the culture of 
the organizations to which they belong (Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011). A study of the introduction 
of high-powered performance contracts in the Netherlands in 2002-2005 shows that the pre-
program selection effects in terms of parking and creaming were negligible in relation to private 
contractors’ attempts to place unemployed people in jobs, whereas the unintended negative 
incentive effects were considerable for the job placement of disabled people (Koning and Heinrich, 
2013). The negative incentive effects of high-powered performance contracts emerged despite 
attempts to minimize them by assigning groups of disabled people with more or less the same job 
prospects to private contractors. On the positive side, however, the introduction of performance 
contracts seemed to enhance job placement overall, although it was not necessarily those who were 
most in need of help who received it. The dilemma here is that strong extrinsic motivation 
associated with high-powered performance contracts may crowd out other important forms of 
motivation.  
The seventh impact factor pertains to the competence, capacity and resources of contractors and 
public managers. The production of high quality services at low cost requires that private providers 
have access to relevant materials and facilities, qualified staff members, and new technologies, 
while public managers need the capacity and experience to manage contracts (Brown, Potoski and 
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Slyke, 2006; Hefetz and Warner, 2011; Lindholst and Bogetoft, 2011; Mattison and Thomasson, 
2007). The choice between different market management tools, the creation of norms and 
procedures for selecting the most promising service providers, collaboration and incentive steering 
in the post-tendering phase, and contract monitoring are all tasks that require professional 
competence and expertise, sufficient resources and capacity. This is confirmed by North American 
studies which show that local governments that have professional city managers are more reluctant 
to contract out when there is little or no competition, and make better use of alternatives to 
competitive tendering, than cities without professional city managers (Hefetz and Warner, 2011). 
Contractors must also be capable of leading and managing their organization in order to ensure the 
efficient deployment of the resources and capacities at their disposal (Amirkhanyan, Kim and 
Lambright, 2007). Management is particularly important in the post-tendering phase. In a 
comparative study of two Swedish cases of service contracting in the local water and sewage sector, 
Mattisson and Thomasson (2007) show that long-term planning was prevented by conflicts between 
purchaser and provider, resulting in reduced service quality in one of the municipalities. In the other 
municipality, the public purchaser had both the competence and the capacity to manage unforeseen 
events, cultivate positive working relations and facilitate mutual learning that, in turn, boosted the 
quality of the provided services. The dilemma with regard to this impact factor is that the more 
public purchasers invest in the development of private contractors’ competences, capacities and 
resources, the more expensive the provided services become, at least in the short run. 
Finally, the information asymmetry between public purchasers and private providers will facilitate 
opportunistic behavior that must be curtailed through monitoring, which constitutes the eighth 
impact factor. Effective contract accountability refers to the ability of public funding agencies to 
design and implement systems that hold service contractors to account for their performance and 
motivate them to fulfill their contractual obligations (Romzek and Johnston, 2005). The theoretical 
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expectation is that monitoring will lead to better outcomes (Peat and Costley, 2001). Effective 
monitoring can either be provided through the collection and consequential assessment of 
performance data, or through joint evaluations, based on dialogue and collaboration, that lead to 
continuous improvement (Romzek and Johnston, 2005; Oh and Park, 2017, Amirkhanyan, Kim and 
Lambright, 2007; Brown, Potoski and Slyke, 2006; Brown and Potoski, 2004). Meanwhile, the 
reviewed studies offer mixed empirical findings. For instance, Oh and Park (2017) find that local 
U.S. governments that effectively monitor contracts reduce operating expenditures. Fernandez 
(2009), on the other hand, shows that monitoring does not improve the outcomes of contracting out 
in local U.S. governments, as opposed to trust which has a significant, positive effect on contract 
performance. The findings indicate that more monitoring is not necessarily the answer, but rather 
how the collected information is put to use (Fernandez 2009), and how public managers create an 
effective system for specifying and monitoring contracts. However, the dilemma is that a control-
based monitoring system is likely to undermine the interpersonal trust that is a precondition for 
dialogue and collaboration. This dilemma demonstrates the interrelated and sometimes conflicting 
roles of the various impact factors. 
Despite these trade-offs and dilemmas, the eight impact factors are likely to increase the chance of 
obtaining beneficial results from contracting out public services. Since the impact factors do not 
arise spontaneously, we need to identify the different forms of public governance, organization and 
management that can help to generate the right impact factors and shape them in such a way that 
they support positive outcomes.  
3.4 Institutional governing practices 
The independent variable in the framework is termed ‘institutional governing practices’. It captures 
the different ways in which public authorities govern contracting out. While institutional governing 
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practices affect, and indeed explain, the impact factors, there is no ‘one best way’, as different 
constellations of institutional governing practices may have the same combined effect on the impact 
factors. However, variations in the structural context – including the size and economic affluence of 
government, the level of trust in society, a tradition for public-private interaction, the size of 
markets, the type of services, etc. – may support the development of local equilibria that are hard to 
change due to the combination of positive feedback mechanisms and sunk costs that tend to produce 
strong path dependence (Pierson, 2000). 
We previously explained how our independent variable of institutional governing practices can be 
divided into more or less interdependent forms of governance, organization and management 
(March and Olsen, 1995). Based on the systematic literature review, these different and interrelated 
governing practices are further operationalized into a catalogue of tools and procedures associated 
with contracting out (see Tables 2-4). Some of these tools are presented and discussed in the 
previous section, e.g. the use of governance tools such as the ‘unbundling of services’ to mediate 
the level of competition and thereby improve contract performance. We will not discuss each tool 
further here, as our main focus is on the causal link between governance practices and the outcomes 
of contracting out in terms of the eight impact factors. The purpose of tables 2-4 is merely to 
provide researchers and practitioners with an overview of the tools available to mediate the 
influence of the eight impact factors on the outcomes of contracting out.  
Governance concerns those particular tools and instruments aimed at regulating the behavior of 
public purchasers and private providers, such as public policies and regulations, procedures 
regulating the pre-contracting phase, and procedures regulating the contracting phase. Table 2 




Table 2: Governance tools 
Procedures regulating the pre-contracting phase: 
Procedures for when and how to involve private providers in describing requests for 
proposals 
Procedures for using pre-qualification if there are too many potential bidders 
Procedures for unbundling service tasks to enhance the number of bidders, and redefining 
these tasks so that they match the competences and capacities of potential bidders 
Procedures for writing a precise and informative request for a proposal, advertising it, and 
meeting with potential bidders to respond to their questions 
Systematic use of a mixed model whereby the public sector retains some aspects of a service  
Procedures regulating the contracting phase: 
Procedures for writing precise and relatively complete contracts  
Procedures for adjusting contracts by changing the specified tasks, the incentive structure, the 
reporting system, the length of the contract, and the terms for extension 
Specification of incentive structures and other performance enhancing governance 
instruments such as ear-marked funding, joint investment plans and sharing of cost savings 
Contractual obligation of contract holders to participate in continuous dialogue about service 
production 
Procedures for measuring and assessing performance on the basis of spot checks, external 
control, joint inspection, statistical reports, qualitative evaluations and the number of 
complaints 
Systematic use of different kinds of sanctions or procedures for working out negotiated 
solutions in response to contract breaches and poor performance 
23 
 
Clear rules for insourcing, contract extension and re-tendering 
 
Organization refers to the way that public authorities support and organize the contracting out of 
public services. It comprises the division of labor and collaboration, organizational competence and 
capacity, and organizational culture. Table 3 provides an overview of these organizational 
conditions. 
Table 3: Organizational conditions 
Division of labor and collaboration: 
Rules for when to use intergovernmental requests for proposals that reduce average 
transaction costs and increase the size of the market* 
Delegation of responsibility to a lead contractor for contract monitoring in relation to sub-
contractors  
Organizational competence and capacity: 
Presence of adequate competences for the coordination of complex processes, technical and 
legal counseling, contract negotiation, performance management, and internal and external 
communication 
Capacity for training private contractors to produce and deliver specialized public services 
and to manage the deployment of the resources they have at their disposal 
Organizational culture: 
Political-administrative learning culture conducive to enhancing mutual learning and 
expanding the joint knowledge base 




Management refers to attempts by political and administrative leaders to influence the perceptions 
and actions of relevant and affected actors in order to align values and optimize the preparation, 
negotiation and implementation of service contracts. Table 4 provides an overview of different 
forms of political and administrative management that are likely to affect the impact factors.  
Table 4: Political and administrative management 
Political management: 
Political justification for contracting out that states which goals are to be achieved (economic 
efficiency, quality improvement, etc.) 
Political decisions about special demands in regard to the contractors, including the setting of 
a price ceiling for services that are contracted out (reverse tendering) 
Administrative management: 
Management of goal conflicts implicit in outsourcing through goal alignment strategies  
Orchestration of agenda setting in relation to planned outsourcing initiatives through dialogue 
with firms, industry organizations, experts and other local and regional governments  
Management of resistance, protests and dissatisfaction among end users and their relatives  
Management of contract negotiations including specification of price and quality 
Management of contract monitoring including decisions about when to use hard and soft 
sanctions 
 
The listing of institutional governing practices in Tables 2-4 may not be exhaustive, and further 
studies may add to it. Nevertheless, the three tables provide a comprehensive overview of relevant 
factors that, in different constellations, can generate the right impact factors, which, in turn, can 
improve the outcomes of contracting out.  
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4. Discussion: Use and relevance of the theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework enables researchers and practitioners to link the outcomes of contracting 
out, notably in terms of higher quality and lower costs, to eight crucial impact factors. The aim is to 
offer a catalogue of factors relating to institutional forms of governance, organization and 
management, which public managers can use to achieve the desired outcomes and assess them in 
the light of feedback. While practitioners will be able to use the framework to identify levers to 
enhance competition, flexible adjustment or other important impact factors in the pursuit of value 
for money, researchers will find it useful in generating hypotheses for the empirical testing of the 
contracting out of different types of services. In the following, we provide two examples of how 
such hypotheses might be developed from the framework, and suggest which empirical steps might 
be taken to further the research agenda and test these hypotheses empirically.  
First, the review shows that there is only limited research on the impact of governance on the 
outcomes of contracting out in human services such as elder care. Hence, we might ask ourselves 
how contracting out can increase value for money due to improved coordination and collaboration 
between public purchasers and private providers in the field of elder care. The catalogue of 
institutional governing practices reveals a number of relevant triggering factors. In terms of 
governance tools, coordination and collaboration can be enhanced by establishing procedures for 
when and how potential contractors should be involved in drafting requests for proposals, making 
sure that they are contractually obliged to participate in continuous dialogue, and attempting to find 
negotiated solutions to contract breaches and mal-performance. In terms of organizational 
conditions, it is crucial to strengthen the range of organizational competences available for 
coordinating complex processes, and to negotiate and communicate with private providers in order 
to achieve the desired outcomes, as well as to articulate an organizational discourse that emphasizes 
trust and collaboration. Finally, a variety of management factors can enhance coordination and 
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collaboration, such as the management of goal conflicts implicit to contracting out, the orchestration 
of agenda-setting dialogue meetings with a clear focus, and the handling of contract negotiations 
with a view to securing the trust-based exchange of knowledge and information. These causal 
relations can be translated into testable hypotheses such as: ‘Contractual obligation of private 
providers to participate in a continuous dialogue will enhance coordination and collaboration and 
increase value for money’. 
Alternatively, we may ask how value for money can be increased by ensuring that private providers 
have the competences and capacities that are needed to deliver high quality, low cost services; and 
which local governing practices will facilitate this particular impact factor. In terms of governance 
tools, the answer is that procedures for the pre-qualification of private bidders, the use of shadow 
proposals drafted by public service organizations, and incentives for private providers to invest in 
technology and capacity building will help to ensure that private contractors can achieve the goals 
and meet the standards specified in the contract. In terms of organizational conditions, the 
organizational capacity to train private contractors, and organizational designs that facilitate the 
transfer of facilities and equipment from public to private contractors - perhaps even including joint 
facilities - will help to ensure adequate competences and capacities. Last, but not least, if contract 
negotiation is managed in a way that facilitates the exchange of relevant knowledge and 
information, this will help to identify gaps in the competences and capacities of the private 
contractors and to draw up plans for closing these gaps. Again, it is possible to translate these causal 
relations into a series of testable hypotheses such as: ‘The use of shadow proposals helps to test the 
presence of adequate competences and capacities and increases value for money’.  
Systematic empirical testing of these and other hypotheses that can be derived from the theoretical 
framework will advance our insights about a relatively neglected area in the expanding research on 
contracting out. It will help us to build an interdisciplinary theory that combines insights from 
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public administration with insights from public economics. The reviewed studies show a 
widespread use of cross-sectional (case studies and surveys) and to some degree longitudinal 
research designs to empirically examine the governance of contracting out. The next step would be 
to use QCA to identify the causal link between different constellations of governance practices, 
impact factors and outcomes. Moreover, survey experiments and – if possible - field experiments 
among public procurement officers and private providers can test the effect of those constellations 
and estimate by how much the outcomes of contracting out improve. 
5. Conclusion 
A systematic review of 21 studies conducted between 2000 and 2018 has confirmed the paucity of 
research on the role and impact of governance, organization and management. With a view to 
contributing to this type of research, we have presented a theoretical framework that combines 
existing theoretical and empirical insights from the past two decades on the impact of local 
governance on the outcomes of contracting out. The framework 1) connects the production of value 
for money from service contracting with a number of impact factors that are known to be conducive 
to positive outcomes; and 2) links these impact factors to a broad catalogue of governance tools, 
organizational conditions and management practices that singly, or in different constellations, 
promote and enhance the impact factors. The theoretical framework can inform and structure the 
ways that practitioners and researchers make inferences from governance issues to the results of the 
contracting out of public services. The examples presented show how the theoretical framework can 
help to generate testable hypotheses, and demonstrate the need for further research in this area that 
will hopefully benefit from the assumptions and ideas set out in the above.
Notes 
                                                          
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1. The databases were: Social Science Citation Index, Sociological Abstracts, Social Services 
Abstracts, Education Resources Information Center, PILOTS Data base, Campbell Library, 
Cochrane Library, DanBib, Den Danske Forskningsdatabase, Swepub, Libris, CRIStin, BIBSYS 
ForskDok. 
2. Outcomes of contracting out are defined and empirically analyzed in many different ways, 
making it difficult to develop a list of relevant performance terms. Hence, we would have risked 
excluding studies from our search if we had included outcomes in our search string. Instead, we 
went through the more cumbersome work process of reading through identified studies on 
contracting out and governance to find those that analyze outcomes of relevance to our research 
question. 
3. The search terms were: contracting out, contracting, outsourcing, tender, competitive tender, 
competitive bidding, marketization, marketization and public. 
Author’s accepted version.  
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